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NEGLIGENCE CAUSATION FAILURE TO SIGN LICENSE A New
Hampshire statute provided that a motor vehicle operator's license should not
be valid until endorsed on the margin by the operator.1 In a negligence action
arising out of an automobile collision it was shown that defendant operator's
license had not been endorsed. Plaintiff requested the court to charge that de-

1

N, H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 101, § 6.
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fendant's license was not valid and that defendant's violation of the statute was
a legal cause of the accident, entitling plaintiff to recover unless found guilty
of contributory negligence. Held, that defendant's failure to endorse his signature was not such a statutory violation that plaintiff could take advantage of
it in this proceeding. Cutler v. Young, (N. H. 1939) 6 A. (2d) 162.
In Johnson v. Boston & Maine R. R.,2 the New Hampshire court laid
down the broad rule that failure to have a motor vehicle operator's license is
a causal violation of a statutory rule of conduct,8 and therefore, that an unlicensed operator is precluded from recovery. It felt that the statute was designed to keep unfit operators from the roads in order to protect other users
of the highways and that an unlicensed operator could not complain if classed
with the unfit because he had not taken the "prescribed method to establish his
fitness in advance." 4 This rule has been repeatedly affirmed in New Hampshire/
although the majority of courts hold that there is no causal relation between the
mere statutory violation and the injury. 6 However, there has been no tendency to
extend this rule further. In another case 1 the New Hampshire court, in refusing
to hold that plaintiff was barred from recovery because his horse-drawn vehicle
was not equipped with an attached light as required by statute,8 reasoned that
failure to comply with a self-protective statutory requisite should not make one
a wrongdoer. Again, a passenger was not denied recovery because riding with
an unlicensed operator.9 In a recent New Hampshire case 10 the owner who
permitted an unlicensed person to drive his automobile in violation of a statute
was held not precluded from recovery because she had reasonable grounds for
believing that the operator was licensed. Here the court commented sharply
that the "Johnson case goes to the verge of the law" and hinted that if the
legislature intended to make a license a safety requirement it should have gone all
the way and made definite provisions for examination of operators. Allen, C. J.,
dissenting in a previous hearing of this case,11 felt that the doctrine of the
Johnson case was broad enough to cover cases of avoidable ignorance and that
no specific intent to do wrong was necessary; he justified this view partly on the
ground that four legislative sessions had passed since the Johnson ruling and
that during that time there had been no change in the statute there interpreted
and that an attempt to amend it by making the common-law rule of causation
applicable had been defeated. Support for the dissent, which would also be support for a contrary holding in the principal case, is found in the Massachusetts
decisions. Massachusetts follows the majority view as far as unlicensed opera2 83 N. H. 350, 143 A. 516 (1928).
a N. H. Laws (19zx), c. II9, § 8; Pub. Laws (1926), c. 101, § 9.
4 Johnson v. Boston & Maine R. R., 83 N. H. 350 at 360, 143 A. 516 (1928).
s L'Esper;mce v. Sherburne, 85 N. H. ··103, 155 A. 203 (1931); Prescott v.
Yurchus, 86 N. H. 108, 164 A. 218 (1933).
.
6 BERRY, AUTOMOBILES, 5th ed., 227 (1926).
1 Eastman v. Herrick, 87 N. H. 58, 173 A. 807 (1934).
~N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 90, § 5.
9 Clark v. Town of Hampton, 83 N. H. 524, 145 A. 265 (1929); Vidal v.
Errol, 86 N. H. 1, 162 A. 232 (1932).
10 Bowdler v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., (N. H. 1939) 4 A. (2d) 871.
11 Bowdler v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 88 N. H. 331, 189 A. 353 (1937).
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tors are concerned; 12 but it is in the minority as to unregistered motor vehicles,1 8
ho~ding that they are trespassers on the highway and that the owners and occupants thereof are entitled to recover only for personal and property injuries
sustained as a result of wilful or W'allton negligence.14 In applying this rule,
the Massachusetts courts have been quite strict as to what constitutes a registered
automobile; relatively minor infractions have put the motor vehicle in the outlaw class.1n Nor is any specific intent to violate the statute nece$lll")'.18 In rejecting this strict approach, the New Hampshire court is apparently determined not
to get too far from, or is veering toward the majority rule in respect to
unlicensed operators. Of course, the defendant in the principal case had taken
the prescribed method to establish his fitness in advance and had been found
qualified. Only a formality remained, yet it was expressly made important by
statute. The court apparently felt that the defendant had substantially complied
with the purpose of the statute and should not su:ffer in a civil action because
of failure to c;omply fully. The present New Hampshire rule seems to limit the
Johnson decision to those situations where the operator actually has no license;
while not widely accepted, this is at least more plausible and justifiable than
the Massachusetts "outlaw'' rule.

Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (19II),
Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861 (1916) (severe criticism of the
Massachusetts rule); BERR.Y, AUTOMOBILES, 5th ed., 230 (1926).
16 Dudleyv. Northhampton St. Ry., 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25 (1908) (directed
verdict for defendant because plaintiff, a non-resident operator, had exceeded the fifteen-day grace period of the Massachusetts vehicle registration statute); Potter v.
Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49, 184 N. E. 373, 87 A. L. R. 1462 (1933) (unregistered
motorcycle held nuisance).
111 Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N. E. 35, 47 A. L. R.
IIOO (1926) (use of maiden name on registration of married woman's car held
illegal, precluding recovery for negligence); Ricker v. Boston Elevated Ry., 290 Mass.
III, 194 N. E. 815 (1935) ("78 Kilsyth Road, Brookline" instead of "78 Kilsyth
Road, Brighton" held improper registration, precluding recovery).
18 Di Cecca v. Bucci, 278 Mass. 15, 178 N. E. 447 (1931) (wrong town on
registration held to be defense in negligence action without proof that the owner
knew or had reason to know of the violation).
12
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